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Copp: To the Last Canadian?

To the Last Canadian?
Casualties in 21st Army Group
Terry Copp

W

hen Fields of Fire: The Canadians
in Normandy was assessed
before publication the commentators
were particularly unhappy with the
historiographical summary which
challenged the received version of
combat effectiveness in Normandy.
No one offered serious criticism of
the evidence; it was the tone that
concerned them. My autobiographical
comment about Clausewitz that as “a
social historian escaping a world
dominated by Marxists I was entitled
to be suspicious of yet another 19th
century authority figure” was not well
received. To follow this with pointed
criticism of C.P. Stacey and John A.
English not to mention Carlo D’Este
and Max Hastings was considered
ill-mannered and presumptuous.
After publication the book received
a number of favourable reviews as
well as some sharply critical ones.
The focus of these critiques was
my rejection of the notions that the
German army in Normandy had
demonstrated consistent “tactical
superiority” and the last paragraph
of my conclusion which read:
The Canadian citizen army that
fought in the Battle of Normandy
played a role all out of proportion
to its relative strength among the
Allied armies. This was especially
true within 21st Army Group where,
due to a mixture of Canadian pride,
and the British desire to limit their
own casualties, Canadian divisions
were required to fight more often
than their British counterparts.

Abstract: In Normandy, Canadian infantry
divisions suffered a higher rate of
casualties than British divisions engaged
in similar operations. These figures
have been used by some historians to
prove Canadian failure on the battlefield.
However, by using statistics gathered by
operational research scientists during
the war, this article shows that the
“considerably heavier casualties” suffered
by the Canadians in Normandy and beyond
were the product of a greater number of
days in close combat with the enemy, not
evidence of operational inexperience or
tactical failure.
The oft-quoted statistics, which
show that the Canadians suffered
considerably heavier casualties than
other divisions in 21 Army Group,
are the product of a greater number of
days in close combat with the enemy,
not evidence of operational or tactical
failure. Perhaps it is time to recognize
the extraordinary achievements
that marked the progress of the
Canadians across Normandy’s fields
of fire. 1

I wish to provide in this paper a
detailed analysis of casualties in 21st
Army Group which will substantiate
the argument made in Fields of Fire.
Before I take you through the hard
evidence I want to offer a brief
history of the formation of both the
combat effectiveness and casualty
rate hypotheses.
A number of years ago my
longtime friend Jack Granatstein
provided readers of the Toronto Star
with an account of what he called
the left-wing takeover of social
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labour history in Canada. The article,
title “No Hostages taken in war
between historians” noted that Terry
Copp “left the field in disgust after
full-fledged assaults from Marxist
historians.” All of this came as a
surprise to me. I was unaware of any
full-fledged assaults though I did
recall that two of the leading leftists,
Greg Kealey and Brian Palmer, had
called me a “corporate liberal.” At
the time I had taken this as evidence
that they had actually read and
understood The Anatomy of Poverty
and recognized my centrist, incomeredistribution bias.
While work on industrial
unionism in the 1940s was interesting
to me, the truth is that the purpose
had been to lay the foundation for
a sequel to The Anatomy of Poverty
examining the prosperity of the
1940s and 1950s. Success stories
about capitalism were not a popular
subject among academics in the 1970s
so I was open to the suggestion that
with a sabbatical coming up I should
consider a project with my friend
and mentor Robert Vogel, a military
historian at McGill University. One
attraction was exchanging time
in labour archives in places like
Hull, Detroit and New Jersey, for
France, Belgium and Holland. In
the spring of 1981 my wife and I
made our first visit to the Second
World War battlefields. Experience
as an officer cadet in the Canadian
Officers’ Training Corps during my
undergraduate years had given me an
unfashionable but very real respect
3
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basis of a research question which
I have argued in a number of books
and articles. A second research
question, the one we are focusing
on today, also developed out of my
interest in the battles in the Scheldt
Estuary.
My uncle Douglas “Paddy”
Copp, who had served as a company
sergeant-major in the British 52nd
Lowland Division, had a number of
stories about his wartime experience
including strong views about the
Canadians he had met in Holland.
He thought they were undisciplined,
dirty, tough, accomplished soldiers
who were, by late October 1944,
in very rough shape. He could not
understand why his full-strength,
highly trained division had sat out
the war in Scotland and was even
at this late date used so sparingly
in the struggle to open Antwerp.
In Cinderella Army I sketched the
tension between the Canadians and
Scots which my uncle described and

archival sources confirmed. I was able
to establish that after 52nd Division’s
role in the deception operation
“Fortitude North,” an attack on
Norway, ended, and its second role
as an air transportable division was
discarded with the failure at Arnhem,
Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke wanted
to save the division for the Far East.
In fact, in October 1944 Brooke also
asked Montgomery to return 3rd
British Infantry Division, a regular
division, to the UK for use in Burma.
Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery
persuaded him to leave 3rd Division
and send 52nd to the continent, but
the Far East, the Mediterranean and
post-war occupation issues loomed
large in Churchill and Brooke’s
calculations.2
When I read this exchange in
the Alanbrooke Papers some of my
innocence about British war-time
goals disappeared but it was not
until much later when I was trying
to get background on Operation
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for the Canadian army but I had not
read much military history. I decided
to go and see the battlefields before
I began to write about them. At the
time, Bob Vogel and I were focused
on the battle for the approaches to
Antwerp and despite constant rain
my wife and I spent a week walking
the ground. I defy anyone with an
open mind who visits the Leopold
Canal or Woensdrecht ridge to
come away without developing a
profound respect for the men who
fought to overcome their enemy
in such terrain. The ground, as my
students have heard me say so often,
must be the military historians’ basic
primary source. When I learned
from military historians that the
attacker was supposed to have
at least 3:1 odds to overcome the
defender and calculated that in the
Scheldt, the ratio was seldom better
than 1.5:1 my skepticism about
German combat effectiveness versus
Canadian inexperience became the

Canadian casualties in Normandy along the road to Bretteville-sur-Laize, 9 August 1944.
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The Canadian War Cemetery at Beny-sur-Mer, France. This cemetery contains the bodies of over 2,000 Canadians
who were killed in on D-Day and in the battles which lead to the capture of Caen in early July 1944.

“Wallstreet,” the plan to cross
the Rhine at Arnhem in February
1945 that I began to wonder if a
pattern was emerging.3 General G.H.
Macmillan, the commander of 49th
West Riding Division, had developed
“Wallstreet,” and convinced Simonds
of its merits but Montgomery was not
interested. My interviews, especially
with Brigadier Trevor Hart Dyke,
a former battalion commander in
49th Division, suggested that the
officers of 49th Division could not
understand why they spent most of
the war holding quieter sections of
the line or conforming to the advance
of other formations during offensive
action.4
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Further research in British sources
indicated that in Normandy the 53rd
Welsh Division played a holding
role except for a very brief period in
August. Other British divisions also
experienced prolonged stretches of
relative inactivity, at least in contrast
to the Canadian experience. During
the struggle to close the Falaise
and Trun-Chambois gap, British
divisions, in a position to intervene
decisively, were ordered to keep out
of the messy business of trapping
a German army so that they could
concentrate on preparation for the
advance to the Seine and the Rhine.5
This kind of evidence is what led
me to argue that the “considerably
heavier casualties” suffered by the

Canadians in Normandy and beyond
were the product of a greater number
of days in close combat with the
enemy, not evidence of operational
inexperience or tactical failure. Now
thanks to Army Operational Research
Group Report 21/54 “Battle Wastage
Rates of Personnel in War,” I am able
to fully document this contention.
The report, from the Ronnie Shephard
Operational Research Archives at the
Laurier Centre for Military Strategic
and Disarmament Studies, will be
published in full in the near future
with an appropriate introduction.6
The Army Operational Research
Group produced their study in
1946 to provide “a reliable means
of forecasting battle and non-battle
5
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wastage under varying military
conditions.” During the war both
the British and Canadian armies
had used tables of wastage rates
developed by Major-General Evett
who in turn had created wastage
table based on Great War experience.
These tables expressed “wastage as a
percentage of strength lost per thirty
days of activity at Intense, Normal,
and Quiet levels.” Intense rates were
defined as “at least one battalion
engaged in full scale defensive or
offensive fighting.”7 I have used these
criteria to add the data on Canadian
casualties suffered under “intense”
conditions.
Our concern today is with the
data on infantry division casualties
in Northwest Europe which
Field Marshal Montgomery had
drawn attention to in his Memoirs.
Montgomery’s table of “Cumulative
Casualties by Divisions, 6 June to 1
October 1944,” revealed that “3rd
Canadian Infantry Division had more
casualties than any other division in
the army group and the 2nd Canadian
Division was next.” 8 C.P. Stacey
who presented this information in
the context of his criticism of the
performance of Canadian formations
did not consider evidence about the
number of days divisions spent in
intense combat and his views have
continued to influence historians. 9
Table 1 contains information that
might be of interest.
The operational research group
recognized that British divisions were
not committed to many significant
offensive or defensive operations
between 1 October and 30 December
1944 so they combined the three
month period into a single table. The
43rd Division with seven days of
intense combat was the most heavily
committed with 3rd British at five
days second. Table 2 compares the
British and Canadian experience for
those three months.
The data presented today is
incomplete, particularly with regard
to casualty rates under “normal”
6
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Intense Combat Days and Casualties, by Infantry Division
6 June to 30 September 1944

Division

Days in Intense Combat
June July

Aug

Sept

Total

Total
Casualties

Casualties
per Day

3rd

7

8

6

1

22

7,342

333

15th

7

6

6

8

27

7,601

281

43rd

2

10

8

4

24

7,605

316

49th

5

0

1

2

8

5,894

736

50th

8

4

3

0

15

6,701

446

51st

5

3

8

2

18

4,799

266

53rd

0

0

5

5

10

4,984

498

3rd Cdn

6

7

8

10

31

9,263

298

2nd Cdn

0

8

15

7

30

8,211

273

Table 2
Intense Combat Days & Casualties
1 October to 31 December 1944
Days

Casualties

Ten British Divisions

25

12,528

Three Canadian Divisions

54

10,097

conditions. In July and August 1944,
especially during what I have termed
the stalemate, casualties suffered
while in “normal” contact with the
enemy, without significant offensive
or defensive actions, accounted for
30 percent of all casualties. There
are other limitations including the
exclusion of exhaustion casualties
from the totals but I think there is
enough evidence to substantiate my
statement that casualties are closely
related to the number of days spent
in close combat and to explain why
I continue to argue that the heavier
casualties suffered by Canadian
divisions in 1944 are the result of
a greater number of days in close
combat with the enemy, not evidence
of operational or tactical failure.
Notes
This is a revised text of Terry Copp’s
presentation to the 19th Military History
Colloquium at University of Waterloo, May
2008.
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